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Abstract—With the advent of the Internet of Things, the 
security of the network layer in the Internet of Things is getting 
more and more attention. Traditional intrusion detection 
technologies cannot be well adapted in the complex Internet 
environment of the Internet of Things. Therefore, it is extremely 
urgent to study the intrusion detection system corresponding to 
today's Internet of Things security. This paper presents an 
intrusion detection model based on improved Genetic Algorithm 
and Deep Belief Network. Facing different types of attacks, 
through multiple iterations of the GA, the optimal number of 
hidden layers and number of neurons in each layer are generated 
adaptively, so that the intrusion detection model based on the 
DBN achieves a high detection rate. Finally, the NSL-KDD dataset 
was used to simulate and evaluate the model algorithm. 
Experimental results show that the improved intrusion detection 
model combined with DBN can effectively improve the 
recognition rate of intrusion attacks and reduce the complexity of 
the network. 
 
Key words—Internet of Things security; Intrusion detection; 
Deep Belief Network; Genetic Algorithm 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ith the rapid development, Internet of Things (IoT) 
technology has been widely used, from traditional 
equipment to common household appliances, which has greatly 
improved our quality of life [1]. 
However, IoT systems have become an ideal target of cyber 
attackers because of its distributed nature, large number of 
objects and openness [2-5]. In addition, because many IoT 
nodes collect, store and process private information, they are 
apparent targets for malicious attackers [6]. Therefore, to 
maintain the security of the IoT system is becoming a priority 
of the successful deployment of IoT networks [7].  
To detect intruders is one important step in ensuring the 
security of the IoT networks. Intrusion detection is one of 
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several security mechanisms for managing security intrusions, 
which can be detected in any of four layers of IoT architecture 
shown in Fig. 1. The Network Layer not only serves as a 
backbone for connecting different IoT devices, but also 
provides opportunities for deploying network-based security 
defense mechanisms such as Network Intrusion Detection 
Systems (NIDS) [8]. 
There are many intrusion detection methods, such as 
methods based on statistical analysis [9], cluster analysis [10], 
artificial neural network [11] or deep learning [12]. Among 
these methods, intrusion detection based on deep learning 
performs better than other methods [13]. The reason is that deep 
learning has strong abilities, such as self-learning, 
self-adaptation, good generalization, and detection against 
unknown attack behavior.  
For the deep learning algorithm, a network structure may 
have a great detection accuracy for one attack type, but it may 
not have a good detection effect when facing other attacks. 
Therefore, we hope to design a self-adaptive model to change 
the network structure for different attack types, so that our 
intrusion detection model can maintain a high detection rate 
continuously. 
In the past few years, there has been very little research on 
the optimization of the IoT intrusion detection model based on 
deep learning. And, there has not been a unified solution for the 
selection of the number hidden layer and the number of neurons. 
Most of the research is based on trial and error and on pruning 
or constructive methods [14], the network structure and the 
performance cannot be guaranteed. The random selection of the 
number of hidden neurons might some problems. 
In this paper, a new IoT intrusion detection model is 
proposed by introducing genetic algorithm into deep belief 
network to optimize the number of hidden layers and neurons in 
a hidden layer.  
By applying the improved genetic algorithm, for different 
types of attacks, the optimal number of hidden layers and 
neurons in a hidden layer can be iteratively generated, and the 
network complexity can be reduced as much as possible while 
ensuring the detection rate. The solution of these two problems 
of deep network can make the intrusion detection system have a 
greater improvement in performance. 
In this paper, we will firstly introduce the related work of 
intrusion detection based on machine learning in Section II. 
Then we will introduce the proposed algorithm model in 
Section III. In Section IV, we show the experimental results and 
compared it with other methods. This paper is concluded in 
Section V. 
Intrusion Detection for IoT Based on Improved 
Genetic Algorithm and Deep Belief Network 
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II.  RELATED WORK 
The intrusion detection technology based on machine 
learning method can be divided into two major categories: 
intrusion detection based on artificial neural networks and 
intrusion detection based on deep learning [15]. 
Intrusion detection based on artificial neural network is 
generally divided into three sub-categories of neural networks: 
supervised, unsupervised and hybrid. The main type of 
supervised neural networks are multilayer feed-forward (MLFF) 
neural networks. Ryan et al. [16] used MLFF neural network to 
detect anomaly based on user behavior. However, supervised 
neural networks depend on training of a large number of data 
sets. Sometimes the distribution of training data sets is not 
balanced, which makes the MLFF neural network easily reach 
the local minimum value, and thus the stability is low. 
Detection rate of low-frequency attack is a key factor in judging 
the quality of the detection model. The detection accuracy of 
MLFF neural network is low for low-frequency attacks. 
The main advantage of the unsupervised artificial neural 
networks is that new data can be analyzed without tagging data 
in advance. Yu et al. [17] introduced a theoretical foundation 
for combining individual detectors with Bayesian classifier 
combination. This ensemble is fully unsupervised and does not 
require labeled training data, which in most practical situations 
is hard to obtain. The Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOM) 
used in [18] is an unsupervised learning method that extracts 
features from normal system activity and identifies statistical 
changes from normal trends. However, for low-frequency 
attacks, the detection accuracy of unsupervised neural network 
is also low. 
The third category is the hybrid neural network, e.g., 
FC-ANN proposed in [19] is such a model. The FC-ANN 
method introduces fuzzy clustering techniques into general 
artificial neural networks. Using fuzzy clustering techniques, 
the entire training set can be divided into small, low-complex 
subsets. Therefore, based on these subsets, the stability of the 
individual neural network can be improved and the detection 
accuracy can be improved as well, especially for the detection 
of low-frequency attacks. Ma et al. [20] proposed a novel 
approach called SCDNN, which combines spectral clustering 
(SC) and deep neural network (DNN) algorithms. It provides an 
effective tool of study and analysis of intrusion detection in 
large networks. Chiba et al. [21] proposed a cooperative and 
hybrid network intrusion detection system (CH-NIDS) to detect 
the attacks by sensing the network traffic. 
In [22], based on Back Propagation neural networks (BPNN), 
a discussion was made on the selection of the number of hidden 
layers. It is believed that the training set must be analyzed 
before the design of the neural network to correctly estimate the 
similarity between the number of neurons and the number of 
hidden layers. 
At present, there are many intrusion detection technologies 
based on deep learning. Yin et al. [23] proposed a deep learning 
approach for intrusion detection using recurrent neural 
networks (RNN-IDS) which is Suitable for high-precision 
classification model modeling. Abolhasanzadeh [24] proposed 
a method for detecting attacks in big data using Deep 
Auto-Encoder. Gao et al. [25] trained the deep belief network 
(DBN) as a classifier to detect intrusions. Similarly, Alom et al. 
[26] also utilized the capabilities of DBN to detect intrusions 
through a series of experiments. 
However, the above articles mainly select the specific 
network structure through many attempts, and these methods 
are random and irregular. The selected network structure may 
not be optimal and suitable for complex network environment. 
Compared with traditional neural networks, DBN has the 
advantages of multi-layer structure and pre-training with 
fine-tuning learning methods. These advantages enable DBN to 
extract the deep attributes of training set, thus the problems 
existing in the traditional neural network intrusion detection 
methods are solved, such as low training efficiency, easy to fall 
into the local optimum and the need of large amount of tag data 
[27]. 
Many researchers put their effort in analyzing the solution to 
the problem that how many neurons are kept in the hidden layer 
in order to obtain the best result. Liu et al. [28] proposed a novel 
and effective criterion based on the estimation of the 
signal-to-noise-ratio figure (SNRF) to optimize the number of 
hidden neurons in the neural networks to avoid overfitting in 
the function approximation. Rivals and Personnaz [29] used 
techniques based on least squares estimation and statistical tests 
for estimating the number of neurons in the hidden layer. Mao 
and Huang [30] used a data structure preserving (DSP) 
algorithm to fix the hidden neuron. It is an unsupervised neuron 
selection algorithm. Doukim et al. [31] proposed a technique to 
find the number of hidden neurons in an MLP network by using 
coarse-to-fine search technique, which is applied in skin 
detection. This technique includes binary search and sequential 
search. In [32], to fix hidden neurons, 101 various criteria are 
tested based on the statistical errors. At last the selected 
criterion for the NN model is 2 2(4 3) / ( 8)n n+ − , where n is the 
number of input parameters. The results show that the proposed 
model improves the accuracy and minimal error. 
Genetic Algorithms is a method to search for an optimal 
solution by simulating natural evolution processes, but is often 
neglected when choosing the optimal network structure. In this 
paper, in order to solve the low detection rate and weak stability 
of the detection model caused by low-frequency attacks, we 
propose an intrusion detection model based on an improved 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) and Deep Belief Network, for 
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different training types including low-frequency attacks and 
other types of attacks. The corresponding different network 
structures are obtained by iterative evolution through GA, 
thereby detection rate is improved. 
III.  GA OPTIMIZED DBN MODEL 
This paper presents an intrusion detection model by a 
combined GA and DBN. Through multiple iterations of the GA, 
an optimal network structure is produced. The network 
structure contains the number of hidden layers and the number 
of neurons in each layer. This structure is then applied to deep 
belief network for intrusion detection. 
A. Improved genetic algorithm 
Genetic Algorithm is known to be an ideal technique for 
finding optimal solutions to various problems. 
1） Population initialization 
The purpose of initialization is to generate an initial 
population randomly for subsequent genetic manipulation. For 
a simple training set, up to three hidden layers are enough to get 
a good detection rate. Binary coding is the most common 
coding method in genetic algorithm, so we encode the number 
of nodes in the three hidden layers directly in the binary 
chromosome. The length of chromosome is 18 bits: the first 6 
bits are reserved for the first hidden layer, the subsequent 7-12 
bits and 13-18 bits are for the second and the third hidden layers 
respectively, as shown in Fig. 2: 
 
Fig. 2 Chromosome schematic 
 
A chromosome represents a network structure, which has at 
most three hidden layers and at least one hidden layer. Each 
layer has 6 bits. The value of each bit is a binary number 0 or 1. 
The converted decimal number is the number of neurons in a 
layer. According to the rules of thumb, it is shown that an 
acceptable number of neurons in the hidden layer could be the 
size between the input layer and output layer. Therefore, when 
the population is initialized, we must ensure that the number of 
nodes in each layer is smaller than the number of input features 
and greater than the number of output features.  
                                          I N O≤ ≤                                 (1) 
where I  is the size of the input layer, O  is the size of the 
output layer and N is the number of neurons in the hidden 
layer. 
If a chromosome has two layers, then 1-6 bits and 7-12 bits 
are between 000010 and 101000. The 13-18 bits are 000000. 
2） Improved selection 
The selection operation is to select excellent chromosomes 
from the current population and prepare for crossover and 
mutation. As the fitness of candidate individuals increases, the 
probability of being selected increases. In general, a method of 
roulette wheel selection based on proportional fitness 
assignment (also known as Monte Carlo method) is used. 
However, one drawback of this method is that the selection 
based on the generated random number that may lead to some 
individuals with high fitness is eliminated. Therefore, we made 
an improvement: Firstly, we will select the individuals with the 
greatest fitness value to ensure that they can enter the next stage, 
and then select the remaining individuals according to the 
method of roulette. This improvement ensures that the best 
individuals will not be eliminated. 
The specific operations are as follows:  
⑴ Calculate the fitness of each individual in the population 
(i 1,2, ,M)f = ⋯  ，M is the size of population； 
⑵ The individual with the largest adaptation value enters the 
next stage directly; 
⑶ Calculate the probability that each remaining individual is 
passed on to the next generation: 
                                   
1
( )
( )
( )
i
i N
j
j
f x
p x
f x
=
=
∑
                              (2) 
⑷ Calculate the cumulative probability of each individual: 
                                       
1
( )
i
i j
j
q p x
=
= ∑                                 (3) 
 
Fig. 3 cumulative probability 
 
⑸ Generate a uniformly distributed pseudo-random number r 
in the interval [0, 1]; 
⑹ If r < q(1)，select the individual 1，if not，select the 
individual k when q[k-1]<r≤q[k]; 
⑺ Repeat ⑷-⑹ M-1 times. 
3） Improved crossover 
Crossover using partially matched crossover (PMC), the 
traditional method is to exchange randomly selected segments 
from two adjacent chromosomes. However, the two adjacent 
chromosomes, selected by a roulette, are sometimes the same, 
so two chromosomes remain unchanged after the crossover 
operation, and thus this crossover operation has no effect. So 
we take the interval crossover, which is as shown in Eq. 4, for 
example, if we have n  chromosomes, we cross the first one 
with (n/ 2 1)th+  , the second one with (n/ 2 2)th+ , and so on. 
                   c (n/ 2 ) , 1,2, , / 2th thi cross with i i n= + = …               （4） 
where c  representing the individuals generated after the 
intersection. 
To use this exchange method can avoid falling into a local 
optimum, thus the diversity of the next generation can be 
increased and the convergence rate can be accelerated. At the 
same time, another possibility is the number of hidden layers of 
the intersecting individuals is different. For this case, we adopt 
the method of randomly selecting a layer common to both 
chromosomes to crossover. This is done to avoid the situation 
that the number of neurons in an intermediate hidden layer is 0. 
Method is demonstrated in Fig. 4: 
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Fig. 4 Crossing chromosomes with different hidden layers 
 
4） Mutation 
The mutation operation is to change a certain bit in the 
chromosome. It can use the random search ability of mutation 
operator. When the operation result is close to the optimal 
solution neighborhood, it can quickly converge to the optimal 
solution. 
5）  Elite retention strategy 
Crossover and mutation may lead to the loss of the optimal 
individuals in the next generation, and this phenomenon will 
occur in the evolutionary process frequently. In order to prevent 
the loss of the best individuals of the current population, which 
results in that the Genetic Algorithm cannot converge to the 
global optimal solution, an “elite retention” strategy is 
introduced in this paper. After each mutation operation, the best 
individual Α  in this generation is compared with the best 
individual Β  that has appeared in the evolution process so far. 
As shown in Eq. (3), If Β  is greater than Α  , Β  replaces the 
worst individual in this generation and goes to the next 
generation, Α  goes to the next generation directly. If Α  is 
equal or greater than Β  , Α  goes to the next generation 
directly. This process is shown in Eq. 5. 
                               { , ,A if A BC Band A if A B≥= <                       （5） 
where C  represents the one which goes to the next generation. 
B. Setting of Fitness function 
The goal of our model is to obtain a structure with a high 
detection rate. Therefore, the selection of the fitness function 
needs to consider the detection rate of the deep belief network: 
                                   100%corrent
all
N
P
N
= ×                             (6) 
where P  represents the detection rate, correctN  represents the 
number of correctly classified data and
allN  represents the total 
number of data. In this case a network structure with a high 
detection rate can be retained more easily. At the same time, we 
also need to consider reducing the number of hidden layers as 
much as possible on the premise of ensuring the detection rate, 
because the more layers, the longer the training time will take. 
In addition to this, under the premise of meeting the accuracy 
requirements, the structure should be as compact as possible, 
and the network structure should not be too complicated. Also, 
experimental results in [23] show that the number of neurons in 
first and second hidden layers should be kept nearly equal so 
that the network can be trained easily.  
We show the complexity between multiple hidden layers by 
calculating the standard deviation, σ ： 
                             
1
1 2( )
N
i
x
iN
µσ
=
−= ∑                              （7） 
where ix  represents the number of neurons in the 
thi  hidden 
layer， µ  represents the average of the number of neurons in 
each layer，and N is the total number of samples. 
In order to visually display the complexity, we normalize the 
standard deviation as: 
                                  min
max min
σ σ
σ
σ σ
∗ −=
−
                                (8) 
So we use the following equation to calculate the fitness 
function: 
                           1 2 3 (1 )f w p w l w σ
∗= × + × + × −                  (9) 
where p represents the detection rate of the current deep belief 
network, within the range of [0, 1], l  is the reciprocal of the 
number of hidden layers in the network, the smaller the number 
of hidden layers, the larger the reciprocal value is, and the range 
is [0, 1]. σ ∗  is the standard deviation after normalization, 
within the range of [0, 1]. And f  is the fitness value, and 
should be within the range [0, 1]. 
1w , 2w and 3w  are weights. 
After continuous testing, we finally take 
1 0.995w = , 
2 0.005w = and 3 0.005w = . 
                    0.99 0.005 0.005 (1 )f p l σ ∗= × + × + × −                 (10) 
By using Eq. 10, individuals with higher detection rates, 
fewer hidden layers and smaller complexity can be more easily 
retained, so we can obtain structures with high detection rates, 
few hidden layers and low complexity easily. 
The improved GA flow chart is shown in Fig. 5: 
 
Fig. 5 improved GA flow chart 
C. Restricted Boltzmann Machines 
Deep Belief Networks (DBN) is a kind of deep learning 
structure. It is composed of multiple Restricted Boltzmann 
Machines (RBMs), mainly executing unsupervised learning of 
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pre-processed data, processing and abstracting 
high-dimensional data [33].  
 
 
1) Parameter learning 
In RBM, v represents all visible units and h represents all 
hidden units. To determine the model, we only need to obtain 
three parameters of the model: = { }θ W, A, B .There are 
weight matrix W, visible layer element bias A and hidden layer 
element bias B, respectively. 
Suppose an RBM has n visible cells and m hidden cells, iv   
represents the thi  visible unit, ih  represents the 
thj  hidden unit, 
and its parameter form is: 
                                           ,{ }
n m
i jW w R
×= ∈                         (11) 
where ,i jw  represents the weight between the 
thi  visible cell 
and the thj  hidden cell; 
                                             { }
m
iA a R= ∈                              (12) 
where ia  represents the bias threshold of the 
th
i  visible cell; 
                                             { }
n
jB b R= ∈                                (13) 
where jb  represents the bias threshold of the
thj  visible cell. 
For a set of ( , )v h under a given state, assuming that both 
visible and hidden layer obey Bernoulli distribution, the energy 
formula of RBM is: 
            
1 1 1 1
( , | )
n m n m
i i j j i ij j
i j i j
E v h a v b h vW hθ
= = = =
= − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑         (14) 
where, { , , }ij i jW a bθ =  is a parameter of the RBM model, 
and the energy function indicates that there is an energy value 
between the value of each visible node and that of each hidden 
layer node. 
After the exponential and regularization of the energy 
function, the joint probability distribution formula can be 
obtained that the node set of visible layer and the node set of 
hidden layer are in a certain state respectively ( , )v h  : 
                                    
( , | )
( , | )
( )
E v he
P v h
Z
θ
θ
θ
−
=                              (15) 
                                     ( , | )
,
( ) E v h
v h
Z e θθ −= ∑                             (16) 
Where, ( )Z θ  is a normalized factor or partition function, 
representing the sum of the energy exponents of all possible 
states of the node set of the visible layer and the hidden layer. 
The derivation of likelihood function is often used to get the 
parameters. Given the joint probability distribution ( , | )P v h θ  , 
the marginal distribution ( | )P v θ  of the node set of the visible 
layer can be obtained by summation over all states of the hidden 
layer node set: 
                              ( , | )
1
( | )
( )
E v h
h
P v e
Z
θθ
θ
−= ∑                         (17) 
Marginal distribution represents the probability that the set 
of nodes in the visible layer is in a certain state distribution. 
Due to the special layer-layer connection and inter-layer 
connectionless structure of RBM model, it has the following 
important properties: 
① Given the state of the visible cell, the activation states of 
each hidden layer cell are conditionally independent. At this 
time, the activation probability of the
th
j  hidden element is: 
                           ( 1| ) ( )
j j i ij
i
P h v b vWσ= = + ∑                    (18) 
② Correspondingly, when the state of the hidden element is 
given, the activation probability of the visible element is also 
conditional independent: 
                          ( 1| ) ( )i i ij j
j
P v h a W hσ= = + ∑                       (19) 
where, ( )xσ  is the sigmoid function. 
 
2) solving parameters 
To determine RBM model, it is necessary to solve the three 
parameters of the model: { , , }ij i jW a bθ = . 
The parameter solution uses the logarithmic likelihood 
function to take the derivative of the parameter. 
As we know from 
( , | )1
( | )
( )
E v h
h
P v e
Z
θθ
θ
−= ∑ , energy E is 
inversely proportional to probability P, and E is minimized by 
maximizing P. 
The common method to maximize the likelihood function is 
the gradient rise method, which refers to the modification of 
parameters according to the following formula: 
                                      
ln ( )P v
θ θ µ
θ
∂
= +
∂
                           (20) 
This iteration maximizes the likelihood function P and 
minimizes the energy E. 
The format of logarithmic likelihood function: ln ( )
sP v  , sv  
represents the input data of the model, and a single sample is 
first analyzed here, that is, sv  is the 
th
s   sample in the data set. 
Then take the derivatives of the parameters in { , , }ij i jW a b   
respectively： 
      
,
ln ( )
( 1 | ) ( ) ( 1 | )
s
s s
i j i j
vi j
P v
P h v v P v P h v v
w
∂
= = − =
∂
∑        (21) 
                              
ln ( )
( )
s
s
i i
vi
P v
v P v v
a
∂
= −
∂
∑                       (22) 
              
ln ( )
( 1 | ) ( ) ( 1 | )
s
s
i i
vi
P v
P h v P v P h v
b
∂
= = − =
∂
∑       (23) 
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Since the second term of the above three equations contains 
P(v), P(v) still contains parameters, so we solve it by Gibbs 
sampling. 
D. DBN for intrusion detection 
DBN module is mainly divided into two steps in the training 
phase: 
(1) Each RBM is trained separately, characterized by 
unsupervised and independent, to ensure that feature 
information is retained as much as possible when mapping 
feature vectors into different feature spaces. 
In training a single RBM, weight updates are performed with 
gradient descent via the following equation:  
                          
log( ( ))
(t 1) (t)ij ij
ij
p v
w w
w
η
∂
+ = +
∂
                     (24) 
where ( )p v  is the probability of a visible vector, which is given 
by: 
( , )1( ) E v h
h
p v e
Z
−= ∑                              (25) 
Z is the partition function (used for normalizing) and ( , )E v h  
is the energy function assigned to the state of the network. 
The observed joint distribution of the input value x and 
hidden layer
kH is modeled as follows:      
           
2
1 1 1
0
( , , , ) ( ( | )) ( , )
N
N k k N N
k
P x H H P H H P H H
−
+ −
=
= ∏… i         (26) 
where 
0x H= , 1( | )k kP H H−  is a conditional distribution of 
visible units in the k layer with the condition of hidden units of 
RBM. 
1( , )N NP H H−  is the visible-hidden joint distribution at 
the top level of the RBM. This process is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6 RBM training process 
As shown in Fig. 6, the first layer is trained as an RBM, 
assigning the x  input to 1V as the visible layer. 
The input data obtained from the first layer is characterized 
as the second layer’s data. Two ways exist, average activation 
1 0( 1 | )P H H=  or sample 1 0( | )P H H . 
Once an RBM is trained, another RBM is "stacked" atop it, 
taking its input from the final trained layer. The new visible 
layer is initialized to a training vector, and values for the units 
in the already-trained layers are assigned using the current 
weights and biases. The new RBM is then trained with the 
procedure above. This whole process is repeated until the 
desired stopping criterion is met [34]. 
Finally, this process is repeated until to the last layer. This is 
a Deep Learning method. 
(2) The last layer of the DBN is the BP neural network. The 
feature vector of upper RBM is used as an input vector to train 
an entity classifier under supervision. Since the RBM of each 
layer can only ensure its own weight corresponding to the 
feature vector is optimal after the first step training, our 
ultimate goal is to make the overall weight corresponding to the 
feature vector as optimal. So according to the characteristics of 
the BP neural network, the BP neural network can propagate 
error information from the top layer to the bottom layer of RBM. 
If fine-tune the DBN network is finely tuned, a global 
optimization could be achieved. 
The number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in 
each layer in the deep belief network are determined by the 
algorithm model we constructed earlier. 
E. Algorithm flow 
The algorithm flow is summarized as: 
Step1: Initialize the population and generate different 
number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in each 
layer randomly; 
Step2: Calculate the fitness value according to Eq. 8, 
chosen by the roulette method, and keep the optimal individual 
in the present; interval crossover; variation; 
Step3: "Elite" retains, retaining individuals with the 
greatest fitness value during evolution; 
Step4: Determine if the maximum number of iterations has 
been reached. If reached, the generated network structure is 
retained, otherwise iterate Step2- Step3 again; 
Step5: Use the optimal network structure for the deep belief 
network and train the intrusion detection model. 
Step6: Classify the testing set by the trained DBN module, 
and finally match the classification result with the category 
information of the testing set to check the accuracy of the 
classification. 
The algorithm flow chart is shown in Fig. 7: 
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Fig. 7 Algorithm model flow chart 
 
The pseudocode of the algorithm is expressed as follows: 
Algorithm: Intrusion Detection Model 
-- 1f  : the individual with greatest fitness value in this generation 
-- fbest  : the best individuals that emerged during evolution 
-- L  : the number of hidden layers 
-- N  : the number of nodes in every hidden layer 
1: Initialization 
2: Calculate the fitness value of initial population 
3: 0.99 0.005 0.005 (1 )f p l σ
∗= × + × + × −  
4: for I from 1 to 50 
5:      selection 
6:      crossover 
7:      mutation 
8:      calculate the fitness value 
9:      find out the individual 1f   
10:    compare with the 1f  and the fbest   
11:      if  1f fbest>   
12:          1fbest f←  
13:           keep 1f in the next iteration 
14:      else 
15:           keep 1f in the next iteration 
16:           set fbest in the next iteration 
17:           dalete the one with smallest fitness value  
18:      end if  
19:      if  I = 50 
20:           broadcast fbest  
21:           get the L and N from fbest        
22:      end if 
23: end for 
24: for I from 1 to L 
25:       training the thI RBM 
26: end for 
27: Training the BP, fine-tune the RBM 
28: Test DBN with test set  
IV.  EXPERIMENTAL SIMULATION 
A. Experimental data 
KDDCUP99 [35] and NSL-KDD are the most commonly 
used datasets in the intrusion detection research. We used 
NSL-KDD intrusion dataset which is available in csv format for 
model validation and evaluations. The dataset composes of the 
attacks shown in Table 1, and identified as a key attack in IoT 
computing. Sherasiya and Upadhyay (2016) point out that IoT 
objects are also exposed to such types of attacks. Furthermore, 
Sherasiya and Upadhyay (2016) point out that the data that IoT 
objects exchange are of the same value and importance, or 
occasionally more important than a non-IoT counterpart [36]. 
According to the analysis of KDDCUP99 and its latter 
version NSL-KDD, malicious behaviors (attacks) in 
network-based intrusions can be classified into the following 
four main categories: 
 Probe: when an attacker seeks to only gain information about 
the target network through network and host scanning 
activities. 
 DoS (denial of service): when an attacker interrupts 
legitimate users’ access to the given service or machine. 
 U2R (User to Root): when an attacker attempts to escalate a 
limited user’ privilege to a super user or root access (e.g. 
via malware infection or stolen credentials). 
 R2L (Remote to Local): when an attacker gains remote 
access to a victim machine imitating existing local users. 
 
TABLE I 
The attacks in NSL-KDD dataset 
Main class Sub class (attacks) 
in train set 
New sub class 
(attacks) in test set 
DoS Back, land, 
Neptune, 
Smurf, pod, 
teardrop  
Apache2, 
Mailbomb, 
Processtable 
Probe Imap, multhop, 
phf, spy, 
warezclient, 
warezmaster, ftp 
write, guess 
passwd 
Mscan, Saint 
U2R Buffer overflow, 
perl, loadmodule, 
rootkit 
Httptunnel, Ps, 
Sqlattack, Xterm 
R2L Ipsweep, nmap, 
portsweep, satan 
Sendmail, Named, 
Snmpgetattack, 
Snmp guess, 
Xlock, Xsnoop, 
Worm 
 
Since the test set contains 17 new attack types not included in 
the training set, we can evaluate the effectiveness of our 
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algorithm in detecting unknown or uncommon attacks. 
The original dataset consists of 125,973 records of train and 
22,544 records of test, each with 41 features such as duration, 
protocol, service, flag, source bytes, destination bytes, etc. The 
traffic distribution of NSL-KDD dataset is shown as in the 
Table 2. 
TABLE II 
The traffic distribution of NSL-KDD dataset  
Traffic Training test 
Normal 67343 9711 
DoS 45927 7458 
Probe 11656 2754 
R2L 995 2421 
U2R 52 200 
Total 125973 22544 
 
In order to make the classification result more accurate and 
meet the standard conditions of the DBN’s input data set, the 
data set needs to be normalized. Normalization techniques are 
necessary for data reduction since it is quiet complex to process 
huge amount of network traffic data with all features to detect 
intruders in real time and to provide prevention methods. The 
method used in this paper is the Min-Max normalization 
method, also known as deviation standardization, which is a 
linear change to the original data, mapping the resulting value 
to [0, 1], the conversion function is as follows:   
                          *
X Min
X
Max Min
−
=
−
                                (27) 
where Max  is the maximum value of the sample data, and Min  
is the minimum value of the sample data. 
Below is a summary of the metrics we adopted to evaluate 
the detection method: 
 Predicted: normal Predicted: attack 
Actual：normal TN FP 
Actual：attack FN TP 
TP TN
ACC
TP TN FP FN
+
=
+ + +
 
TP
DR
TP FN
=
+
 
FP
FAR
TN FP
=
+
 
TP
Precision
TP FP
=
+
 
( )
TP
Recall
TP FN
=
+
 
where, accuracy (ACC) is the percentage of true detection over 
total data instances; detection rate (DR) represents ratio of  
intrusion instances; false alarm rate (FAR) represents the ratio 
of misclassified normal instances; Precision represents how 
many of the returned attacks are correct; Recall represents how 
many of the attacks does the model return. 
FP: false positive, TP: true positive, TN: true negative, FN: 
false negative. 
B. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
The experiment was conducted using MATLAB R2016a 
running on a personal computer (PC). GA optimized DBN 
model is trained with the training sets and then evaluated using 
the test set. 
C. SIMULATION RESULTS 
First, we need to set the number of generations of the genetic 
algorithm. 
fi
tn
e
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
 
Fig. 8 Genetic algorithm iterative results 
It can be seen from Fig. 8 that as the number of iterations 
increases, the fitness value increases, and when the number of 
iterations exceeds 50, the curve tends to be stable, and the 
fitness value no longer increases with the number of iterations. 
Therefore, we set the genetic algebra of the genetic algorithm to 
50 generations. 
Secondly, set the training times for the BP network. 
a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
 
Fig. 9 BP network training results 
From Fig. 9, we can see that when the number of training 
exceed 80 times, the curve is basically stable, and with the 
increase in the number of training, the classification accuracy 
rate no longer increases significantly and wasted training time 
in vain, so we set the BP network training epochs to 80. 
Then, set the training times for the RBM. 
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Fig. 10 RBM training results 
From Fig. 10 we can see that the training times of RBM have 
little effect on the classification accuracy rate, there is no 
obvious increase or decrease trend, so we set the RBM training 
epochs to 10. 
Finally, we use DoS, R2L, Probe, U2R four classes of attacks 
as intrusion attack training sets respectively. Through an 
improved genetic algorithm, the optimal network structure for 
each type of attack is obtained, the iterative process for each 
type of attacks is shown in Fig. 11: 
0 10 20 30 40 50
generations
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
DoS
R2L
Probe
U2R
 
Fig. 11 Iterative results with different attacks  
We decode the optimal chromosome generated by the 
iteration, and then get the optimal network structure as shown 
in Table 3: 
TABLE III 
Optimal network structure for different types of attacks 
Number Attack Network Structure 
A DoS 41-18-12-2 
B R2L 41-31-2 
C Probe 41-26-2 
D U2R 41-38-2 
The network structure of the deep neural network includes 
the input layer, hidden layer, and output layer. Because each 
record in the data set has 41 features, the size of input layer is 
41; the output has two characteristics: normal and abnormal, so 
the size of output layer is 2. The middle is hidden layer. For 
data sets with different attack types, the different optimal 
network structure is generated by multiple iterations of the 
genetic algorithm. For example, shown in table 1, if DoS is 
used as a training set, the optimal network structure obtained is 
A, the structure is 41-18-12-2. 
Intrusion detection is performed on four classes of attacks 
using the A-D network structures respectively, and their 
detection rates are calculated. Shown in table 4: 
TABLE IV 
Detection rate for different class of attack 
Structure DoS R2L Probe U2R 
A 99.45% 95.18% 90.33% 98.27% 
B 97.60% 97.78% 99.23% 98.38% 
C 50.00% 95.02% 99.37% 98.27% 
D 61.23% 86.32% 99.35% 98.68% 
a
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Fig. 12 Detection rate for different class of attack 
It can be seen from Fig. 12, for a certain type of network 
structure generated by the certain type of attack, the detection 
rate of this type of network is higher than other network 
structures. For example, shown in Fig. 12, the DoS detection 
rate of network structure A generated by DoS as a training set is 
significantly higher than that of other structures; the R2L 
detection rate of network structure B generated by R2L as a 
training set also significantly higher than that of other structures. 
The classification accuracy of Probe and U2R is relatively high 
under all the four network structures, so the comparison results 
are not very significant. It can be seen that the network structure 
adaptively generated by the genetic algorithm has a higher 
detection rate than other network structures. 
At the same time, we compared our method with the methods 
TANN, FC-ANN, SA-DT-SVMS, and BPNN proposed by 
others. Because all four methods use the KDDCUP99 data set, 
the test results are comparative. The results obtained are 
compared with the above methods and summarized in the 
following table: 
TABLE V 
Classification accuracy of each method 
Method DoS R2L Probe U2R 
FC-ANN 96.70% 93.18% 48.12% 83.33% 
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TANN 90.94% 80.53% 94.89% 60.00% 
SA-DT-SVMS 100.00% 93.22% 98.36% 80% 
BPNN 80.35% 89.12% 89.12% 25.58% 
GA-DBN 99.45% 97.78% 99.37% 98.68% 
a
c
c
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%
）
 
Fig. 13 classification accuracy of each method 
It can be seen from Fig. 13 that the proposed GA-DBN 
method has reached a very high level for the detection of four 
types of attacks. The classification accuracy of DoS is higher 
than 99%, and the classification accuracy of R2L, Probe and 
U2R is also significantly higher than other methods. 
The performances of detecting different attack in the 
following table:  
TABLE VI 
The traffic distribution of NSL-KDD dataset 
 ACC
（%） 
DR 
（%） 
FAR
（%） 
Precision
（%） 
Recall
（%） 
DoS 99.45 99.7 0.8 99.20 99.7 
Probe 99.37 99.4 0.7 99.30 99.4 
R2L 97.78 93.4 7.3 92.75 93.4 
U2R 98.68 98.2 1.8 98.20 98.2 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Through GA, the optimal individuals can be generated. DBN 
can effectively process high complex and high dimensional 
data, and the classification results are very good. So in this 
paper, the improved genetic algorithm combined with a deep 
belief networks, GA performs multiple iterations to produce an 
optimal network structure, DBN then uses the obtained network 
structure as an intrusion detection model to classify the attacks. 
In this way, facing different attacks, the problem of how to 
select an appropriate network structure when using deep 
learning methods for intrusion detection is solved, and thus it 
improves the classification accuracy and generalization of the 
model, and reduces the complexity of network structure. 
This method has many advantages: on the one hand, the 
specific network structure generated for specific attack types is 
higher in classification accuracy than other network structures, 
which can reach more than 99%. On the other hand, for small 
training sets, such as U2R, the classification accuracy of our 
algorithm is also significantly higher than other methods. In 
addition, as the model complexity is reduced, the training time 
of DBN can be reduced without affecting the accuracy of model 
classification. 
In addition, the algorithm combining GA and DBN model 
not only can be used in intrusion detection in the IoT, also can 
be applied to other situations, such as classification and 
recognition. For different training sets, an optimal network 
structure is adaptively generated for classification. Moreover, 
for small training sets, high classification accuracy can also be 
achieved, which helps to find low-frequency attacks in 
intrusion detection systems. In the future, we will consider to 
optimize the other parameters of the deep network, reduce the 
training time and improving the accuracy. 
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